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OLD MACDONALD (INC.) HAS A FARM ... MAYBE OR
NEBRASKA'S CORPORATE FARM BAN: IS IT
CONSTITUTIONAL?
Roger D. Colton*
The structure of mid-American's rural "way of life" is com-
monly thought to be predicated upon the family farm as a basic
social and economic unit.' In recent years, however, two trends
have developed relative to farm ownership and operation which will
radically alter this traditional structure. These trends include the
substitution of family farm corporations for individual farmer/oper-
ators and the aggregation of farm ownership and operation into
larger corporate conglomerates.2
This latter trend has generated substantial opposition in agri-
cultural states. By the early 1960s, one noted agriculture-economist
was speculating that the incursion of large-scale non-family corpo-
rations into farming would ultimately stimulate state protective leg-
islation.3 Indeed, although the incorporation of the family farm has
been recognized as being beneficial, even necessary,4 non-family
* B.A., Iowa State University, 1975; J.D., University of Florida, 1981. Member of the
Iowa State Bar. Colton is General Counsel for the Community Action Research Group, Inc.
(CARG). CARG is a non-profit research and consulting firm which specializes in public
policy analysis. CARG is located in Ames, Iowa.
1. Typical of comments is the following statement by a midwestern U.S. Senator:
It is in the interest of the country that the family farm be preserved. The vitality of
this nation is integrally bound up with the health of rural America, and, specifi-
cally, with the economic health of the population that comprises rural America.
For this reason, I am especially disturbed by those who assert the inevitable demise
of the backbone of rural America: the family farm. This is also the reason, in an
effort to reverse or at least significantly abate our headlong descent into a state of
corporate feudalism, that I helped author a bill. . . [which] provides 'for the con-
tinued existence of the family farm, by protecting family farms against the monop-
olization of the agricultural industry.'
Abourezk, Agriculture, Antitrust, and Agribusiness." A Proposalfor Federal Action, 20 S.D.L.
REV. 499 (1975) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as Abourezk].
2. See infra note 29.
3. Harl, Public Policy Aspects ofFarm Incorporation, 20 Bus. LAW. 933, 940-43 (1965).
4. Comment, The South Dakota Family Farm Act of 1974. Salvation or Frustration/or
the Family Farmer? 20 S.D.L. REV. 575, 581 (1975) [hereinafter cited as South Dakota
Comment ].
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corporate farming has been criticized5 and subsequently regulated.6
Due especially to the interstate nature of contemporary agriculture,
however, questions exist as to the constitutionality of state participa-
tion in this regulatory arena. This is particularly true when regula-
tion achieves the level of prohibition.
Prohibiting non-family corporate farming is precisely what the
State of Nebraska recently did. In 1982 Nebraska voters approved7
a state constitutional amendment, the object of which was "to pro-
hibit non-family farm corporations from further purchase of Ne-
braska farm and ranch land, and to prohibit further establishment
of non-family corporate crop and livestock operations. ' ' 8 This arti-
cle will examine that Nebraska constitutional amendment. It will
explore the trends toward corporate farming and examine the Ne-
braska legislation in light of federal constitutional standards.
I. THE TREND TOWARD CORPORATE FARMING
A. The Family Farm Corporation
The changing commercial nature of the farming industry has
created a situation which frequently makes incorporation of the
family farm seem desirable. Technologically complex and possibly
5. See generally Comment, Proposed Anticorporate Farming Legislation, 1972 Wis. L.
REV. 1189 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Comment].
6. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 172C. 1-14 (1983 Supp.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901 to -
5904. Section 17-5901, however, was repealed by S.B. No. 298, Acts of the Legislature of the
State of Kansas (1981). The later legislation "eases substantially the limitations on incorpo-
ration of farm and ranch businesses in Kansas." N. HARL, 6 AGRICULTURAL LAW,
§ 51.04(2)(a)(ii) (1982) [hereinafter cited as HARL]; MINN. STAT. § 500.22 (1980 Supp.);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 951-56 (1982 Supp.); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 57-9A-1 to -
9A-23 (1982 Supp.); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 182.001 (1982 Supp.); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 350.010 to 350.030 (1983 Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 to -0615 (1960). The
North Dakota statute absolutely prohibited corporate farming in that state. However, in
1981, the legislature eased the restrictions to permit family-held farm and ranch corpora-
tions. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-06-01 to 06-15 (1981 Supp.). See S.B. 2233, Acts of the
47th North Dakota Legislative Assembly (1981). HARL, supra at § 51.04(2)(b).
7. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2, states:
The first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be en-
acted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people independently of the
Legislature.
A petition seeking approval of a constitutional amendment must be signed by ten-percent of
the state's electors, including five-percent of the electors of each of two-fifths of the counties
of the state. The total number of electors is set as the whole number of votes cast for gover-
nor at the general election next preceding the election at which the initiative is submitted for
a vote. NEB. CONST. art. I1, § 4.
In 1982, Initiative 300 was entitled "Initiative Petition to Preserve the Family Farm." It
was approved by Nebraska voters on November 2, 1982, winning 56.6-percent of the vote.
8. Initiative 300, supra note 7.
NEBRASKA'S CORPORATE FARM BAN
dangerous machinery creates the need for limiting potential per-
sonal tort liability.9 The use of substantial debt financing creates the
need for limiting potential contract liability.' 0 The rise of in-
tergenerational capital accumulation creates the need for limiting
destructive estate tax liabilities." The corporate form of operation
meets all of these needs while also providing income tax benefits. 12
This change in the farm's commercial structure provides these
benefits to the former owner/operator while avoiding the creation of
any economic or social "threat." The farm as a business enterprise
is characterized by retention of corporate control within a family
with family members becoming shareholders and employees. No
absentee ownership or control results. The family farm is run for a
profit, generally with limited nonfarm investments. Overall,
[t]he farmer . . . who incorporates his business is still the same
independent, community-minded citizen that he was as a sole
proprietor or partner. Few of the objections voiced against the
farm conglomerate are applicable to the family farm corporation.
• . . Far from threatening rural life, the family farm corporation
may well increase the viability of the family owned and operated
farm. !3
Recent reports filed in several Midwestern state capitals document
that a trend toward family farm incorporation has become firmly
established in the 1970s. 14 By 1977, 2,923 corporations reported
farming in Iowa, an increase from the 621 counted in the 1969 Cen-
sus of Agriculture.' 5 Nebraska, during that same period, exper-
ienced an increase from 659 corporations reported in the 1969
Census to 2,209 in 1977. In Kansas, the increase was from 328 to
9. See generally Comment, Considerations When Incorporating the Family Farm, 39
NEB. L. REV. 547, 548 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Nebraska Comment]; Note, Incorporating
the Farm Business: Part !, 43 MINN. L. REV. 305, 311-12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Minne-
sota Note I]. Hall, Agricultural Corporations:- Their Utility and Legality, 17 OKLA. L. REV.
389, 390-91 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hall].
10. See generally Nebraska Comment, supra note 9, at 547-48; Minnesota Note 1, supra
note 9, at 308-15; Hall, supra note 9, at 390-91.
11. See generally Kelley, The Farm Corporation As an Estate Planning Device, 54 NEB.
L. REV. 217 (1975); cf Contemporary Studies Project: Large Farm Estate Planning and Pro-
bate in Iowa, 59 IOWA L. REV. 794 (1974).
12. See generally Note, Incorporating the Farm Business, Part 11 Tax Conservations, 43
MINN. L. REV. 782, 783 (1959); cf. Israel, Corporate Farming and the Money Tree, 4 GA. ST.
B. J. 335, 339 (1967); Family Farm Corporations, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 555, 585-87 (1960).
13. South Dakota Comment, supra note 4, at 581.
14. For the precise reporting required by statute, see generally supra, note 6.
15. NEW DIRECTIONS IN FARM, LAND AND FOOD POLICIES, 43 (Conf. on Alternative
State and Local Public Policies, Wash. D.C., 1981) [hereinafter cited as NEW DIRECTIONS].
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1,037. Most of these corporations were family farms which had
been converted to corporate form.' 6
B. The Conglomerate Farm Corporation
A recent movement toward increasing nonfarm investment in
agriculture has resulted in the growth of the farm conglomerate.
Strident opposition to this trend has developed,' 7 with one U.S. Sen-
ator terming it a "descent into corporate feudalism."' 8 Those farm
corporations which appear to be objectionable are characterized as
being large-scale firms using conglomerate organization; having ab-
sentee ownership or control; representing significant nonfarm in-
vestment; establishing vertical integration; and relying on hired
managers and laborers.' 9 The proliferation of such corporate farms
in the agricultural industry is perceived to threaten the ability of
young farmers to enter the industry, the ability of rural communities
to maintain a high level of social and economic existence, and the
ability of young farmers to adequately compete in the marketplace.
The increasing presence of large nonfarm corporations in the
land market would result in substantial increases in agricultural
land prices. One major impact of such price escalation is that young
farmers will find it more difficult to get started in farming or to ex-
pand their present farm unit to an adequate size. The primary cause
for this cost inflation is the ability and willingness of farm conglom-
erates to "pay more than the going price to get what they want."2
The very presence of additional bidders competing for a parcel of
land is another factor in increasing land prices.2' With farmland
16. Id
17. See, e.g., The Effects of Corporate Farming on Small Business. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopoly ofthe Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; cf. The Ag-Land Trust Proposal- Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Family Farms, Rural Development, and Special Studies, of the House Agricul-
ture Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ag-Land Hearings].
18. Abourezk, supra note 1, at 499.
19. Wisconsin Comment, supra note 5, at 499. Although not every "corporate farm"
need have all of these characteristics,
[ilt is possible to envision the type of corporate farm . . . sought to [be] prohib-
ite[d]. Such a farm corporation is owned or controlled by nonfarmers who supply
the financial backing but do not participate in either farm management or labor.
The farming operations of the corporation may be only a part of a widely diverse
pattern of investment in other nonagricultural areas. Tax advantages rather than
profit may be its primary goal.
South Dakota Comment, supra note 4, at 580.
20. Hearings, supra note 17, at 25.
21. Ag-Land Hearings, supra note 17, at 252-53 (statement of J. Dawson Ahalt, Staff
Economist, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture).
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markets being extremely segmented, the extensive capital which
would be made available by a conglomerate in a few markets would
have significant impacts in each locality.22
The depopulation which would follow the resulting transfer of
ownership 23 and income24 from the rural areas to the metropolitan
areas has a further direct adverse impact on rural towns.
Economic advantages attributable to conglomerate corporate
farming include the ability to vertically integrate the agriculture in-
dustry25 and the ability to buy machinery and supplies in bulk.26
Corporations thus claim an economic efficiency by avoiding the
payment of "full retail prices" in the first instance by purchasing
inputs from its own subsidiaries and in the second instance by
purchasing at the wholesale level.27 In each instance, however, the
impact is to bypass local merchants "such . . .as implement deal-
ers, hardware stores, lumberyards, and feedstores [which] must have
a good number of prosperous farmer-customers to stay in busi-
ness." 28 As farm sizes increase and the number of farm families de-
22. Id. Ahalt said:
The Ag-Land Fund appears insignificant when compared to the $12.2 billion spent
on farm real estate transfers nationally during the year ending March 1, 1976.
However, for this issue, it is improper to consider the market for farmland on a
national scale. Farms are bought and sold in very small localized markets with a
few bidders for each property sold. Only a small percentage of the land in any
community, perhaps 3 to 5 percent, transfers in any I year ... [l]f 10 percent of
the private pension funds, which totaled $215.9 billion in 1975, were invested in
farm real estate markets within a 2-year period, the amount of money in the mar-
ket would be increased by about 78 percent in each year. Such an increase could
dramatically inflate market prices.
23. A distinction needs to be drawn between corporate ownership and corporate opera-
tion. For a more thorough discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 42 to 53.
24. This point was made quite strongly by Professor Richard D. Rodefeld in his testi-
mony before Congress in 1973. He said:
It is very clear that you are going to have a large proportion of the total profits
generated by farm operations leaving the local communities if the farms have ab-
sentee owners. Obviously, a higher proportion of the profit will go to where the
owner is located. If these owners are located in large metropolitan centers, this is
income and revenue that is lost to the local community from which it emanated.
The Role of Giant Corporations in the American and World Economies." Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 4003 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rodefeld].
25. See Wisconsin Comment, supra note 5, at 1195-98; cf. Comment, The Family. How
Are You Going to Keep Them Down on the Farm?, 35 MONT. L. REV. 88, 89-90 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Montana Comment].
26. Wisconsin Comment, supra note 5, at 1193-94.
27. Montana Comment, supra note 25, at 90.
28. 119 CONG. REC. S4817 (1973).
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crease,2 9 rural towns will feel the further economic pinch due to the
"direct effect on such businesses as grocery stores, drugstores, news-
papers and filling stations."3 The widespread incursion of con-
glomerate corporate farming will also cause a decline in the social
well-being of surrounding small towns.3'
Finally, the continued expansion of corporate farming is ex-
pected to adversely affect farm competition as nonfarm corporations
begin agricultural production in order to set-off farm expenses
against other nonfarm income. 32 Those losses can later be recouped
by capital gains which are taxed at a substantially lower rate than
income.33 As a result, family farmers are placed in the position of
competing against nonfarm corporations which "regularly take farm
losses as deliberate financial policy. 34
In light of these perceived problems with the unchecked expan-
sion of corporate farms, 35 several states have enacted legislation to
further the goal of "family farm preservation."36 Such legislation
generally places restrictions on corporate farm ownership and is
aimed at the "pure investors who have no investment purpose other
than security, appreciation of capital and a current return. 37
29. Nationally, the average farm size increased from 175 to 390 acres between 1940 and
1972. Between 1940 and 1970, the number of workers on family farms decreased by 60%,
the number of hired farm workers decreased by 57%, and the number of farms themselves
decreased by 55%. Abourezk, supra note 1, at 500.
In South Dakota the size of the average farm increased from 781 acres in 1960 to 1,046
acres in 1974. The total number of farms in that state during the same time period decreased
nearly 26%. South Dakota Comment, supra note 4, at 576-77.
30. See supra note 28.
31. Rodefeld, supra note 24, at 4003; Cf. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY THE
PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS, SMALL BUSINESS AND THE COMMUNITY, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). That study compared the communities of Arvin and Dinuba, Cali-
fornia. Arvin was surrounded by small family farms while Dinuba was surrounded by large
corporate farms. The small farm community surpassed Dinuba in such areas as volume of
retail trade, city improvements, social recreation, churches and educational facilities.
32. See I.R.C. §§ 175, 180, 182 (1976);cf Allington, FarmingAs a Tax Shelter, 14 S.D.
L. REV. 181 (1969).
33. See I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1222 (1976).
34. Hearings, supra note 17, at 25.
35. The North Dakota corporate farming statute is the sole exception. Enacted in 1932,
the purpose of the statute was to force corporations which had foreclosed on mortgages to
resell land to individual farmers at the current depressed prices. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 10-06-01-06 (1976), but see supra note 6; cf. South Dakota Comment, supra note 4, at 580-
81.
36. See HARL, supra note 6, at 51.04.
37. Morrison, State Corporate Farm Legislation, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 961, 966 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Morrison].
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II. THE NEBRASKA REGULATORY RESPONSE
Nebraska's constitutional proscription of non-family corporate
farming is the out-growth of a long and bitter legislative and polit-
ical battle.3 8 The state constitutional amendment places restrictions
both on the operation of farms and on the ownership of agricultural
lands.39 The proscription was designed to prevent further incursion
of non-family farm corporations into crop and livestock opera-
tions.40 The Nebraska amendment can be divided into two basic
parts for analysis: 1) the specific prohibitions on operation and
ownership; and 2) the specified exemptions granted both by busi-
ness-type and by activity-type.4'
A. The Proscriptions
1. Operations: In the State of Nebraska, corporations are abso-
lutely prohibited from "engag[ing] in farming or ranching. ' 42 The
constitutional amendment defines farming and ranching to include
the "cultivation of land" for specified agricultural purposes43 or the
"ownership, keeping or feeding of animals for the production of
livestock or livestock products . . ."44 This prohibition on the ac-
tual business of farming45 appears to be aimed at preserving the
present commercial structure of the agricultural industry.
The corporate farming amendment will tend to disrupt the ver-
tical integration of agriculture. Such a commercial structure occurs
when a single corporation controls an industry from the inputs to
the production and distribution system.46 In agriculture,
[c]attle are raised on the corporation's ranchland, fattened in the
corporation's feedlot on grain from the corporation's cropland,
slaughtered and processed in the corporation's packinghouse and
finally sold in the corporation's supermarket. One giant con-
38. See Nebraska Bans Non-Family Corporate Farms, SMALL FAPaM ADVOC. Vol. IV,
No. 2, at 1, 8-9 (Fall 1982).
39. Id
40. Id.
41. This analytical method of reviewing the statute is taken from Morrison, supra note
37, at 964-65.
42. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1).
43. These purposes include the "production of agricultural crops, fruit, or other horti-
cultural products. Id
44. Id
45. For purposes of this article, "farming" will include both "farming" and "ranching."
46. "Vertical integration" is a combination under one management of different business
functions at more than one level. See United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
1983]
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glomerate operating from feedlot to supermarket can easily du-
plicate the efforts of thousands of family ranch and farm units.47
The presence of a vertical commercial structure in the agricultural
industry, it is argued, unduly restricts competition with a resulting
adverse impact on consumers.4 8 Nebraska's prohibition on corpora-
tions engaging in the actual business of farming seeks to prevent this
result by leaving control of agricultural inputs in the hands of a
multitude of family farmers and farm corporations.
2. Ownership: Ownership restrictions in Nebraska are directed to-
ward preventing the expansion of agricultural land holdings by cor-
porations.49  "No corporation," the amendment states, "shall
acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest, . . . in any title to real es-
tate used for farming or ranching in this state. . ." Actual divesti-
ture of land, however, is mandated only in those instances in which
the land was acquired in violation of the constitutional proscriptions
or in which a corporation ceases to meet the criteria defining it as a
"family farm corporation."'" Note also that only "real estate used
for farming or ranching" is affected by the constitutional amend-
ment. Application of the amendment is thus constrained by the
land's actual present use.5z Even if suitable for farming, land not
now used for such purposes does not fall within the terms of the
amendment.-3
47. South Dakota Comment, supra note 4, at 580: "An illustration of such practices is
Tenneco Inc., 'a huge conglomerate with 3.4 billion dollars in assets, that has told its stock-
holders that it is developing a food system based on integration from seedling to supermar-
ket.' " Id. at 580-81.
48. See generally Wisconsin Comment, supra note 5, at 1193-98.
49. Thus, land held by corporations at the time of enactment is not subject to the prohi-
bition. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(D). This grandfather clause has constitutional implica-
tions. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
50. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8().
51. For an outline of the criteria for a family farming corporation, see infra text accom-
panying notes 57-62.
52. This language can be meaningfully contrasted to the Iowa statute. IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 172C.1 to 172C.15 (1982 Supp.).
53. NEB. CoNsT. art. XII, § 8(1)(j). Note, however, that for purposes of the grandfather
clause, the amendment did not employ the "used for farming" language. Rather, the ex-
emption applies to all "agricultural land.., being farmed or ranched, or which is owned or
leased .. .by a corporation. . . .(emphasis added) Id at § 8(1)(D). The grandfather
clause is thus much broader than it should have been. Land which is owned by a corpora-
tion, even if not actually farmed at the time the constitutional amendment was adopted, can
subsequently be farmed by that corporation despite the constitutional proscriptions.
[Vol. 6:247
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B. The Exemptions
Corporate farm legislation is "intended to apply only to farms
producing those crops or products which have been the traditional
core of agricultural production on family farms in the Midwest
area. . .. ,"I The purpose of such legislation is to retain the family
farm as the primary producer of food and fiber in the United
States. 5 Thus, "where the [corporate farm] prohibition is more
broadly drawn, exceptions reduce the effect back to this common
denominator."56 That is the case in Nebraska as well.
1. By business type: Not all corporations are prohibited from ac-
quiring agricultural land in the State of Nebraska. The "family
farm corporation" is included as the major exception from the gen-
eral prohibition. 7 The definition of a "family farm corporation" is
based upon the major factors of corporate purpose and corporate
ownership. A family farm corporation must be "engaged in farming
or ranching or the ownership of agricultural land,"58 and all of the
shareholders of the family farm corporation must be natural per-
sons.59 A majority of the voting stock must be held by persons who
are related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred, 60 and
at least one of the family members must reside on the farm or be
actively engaged in its "day-to-day labor and management."' 61 It is
important to note that the required nexus between the family and
the actual operation of the farm is phrased in the conjunctive. An
active day-to-day family involvement simply in the "management"
54. Morrison, supra note 37, at 967.
55. One agricultural commentary states:
The continuing decline in the number of farms nationally and the rising number of
corporations, absentee and foreign interests involved in agriculture has alarmed
farm organizations and farm communities." Farmers in the Great Plains and Mid-
west have been particularly worried about this problem. These farmers fear that
the California agricultural economy-in which corporations grow, process, trans-
port and market most farm produce-will sweep relentlessly eastward.
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 39.
56. Morrison, supra note 37, at 967.
57. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(A).
58. Id
59. Id Two exceptions exist, however. "[A] trust created for the benefit of a member"
of the farm family can hold the majority of stock; no corporation can hold any stock in a
"family farm corporation" unless all of the stockholders of such a corporation are related
within the fourth degree of kindred to the majority of stockholders in the family farm corpo-
ration. Even then, such a corporation could not hold a majority stock ownership in the
family farm corporation.
60. Id.
61. Id.
19831
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of the farm is insufficient to qualify it as a family farm corporation.
The amendment also eliminates the logical loophole for businesses
to utilize to avoid corporate ownership restrictions. Corporations
are prohibited from forming subsidiaries, facially owned and con-
trolled by a "farm family", for the sole purpose of farming and farm
ownership. It seems clear that corporations owning farmland are
intended to be small, closely-held corporations with farming as their
principal business.62
2. By activity type: Corporations otherwise prohibited from ac-
quiring or obtaining agricultural land in Nebraska are exempted
from this proscription if engaged in specified activities.63 Such ac-
tivities are readily justifiable when compared to the purpose of the
amendment, to protect the family farm. 64 First, the ability of corpo-
rations in the financial sector to take interests in land either as secur-
ity for an encumbrance 65 or in satisfaction of an encumbrance 66 is
protected. The reasoning behind this exemption is apparently that
such acquisitions do not manifest a corporate desire to become ac-
tively engaged in the business of farming. 67 Indeed, it would be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to obtain necessary debt financing without
the security of the land to serve as the foundation of the financial
transaction.68
Second, protection is established for farms operated for "re-
search or experimental purposes" 69 if the commercial sales from
land used for those purposes are "incidental to the research or ex-
62. Thus, the exemptions for nonprofit corporations in § 8(l)(B) would seem unwise.
The nonprofit nature of the corporation would not change the character of the harm to be
prevented. Indeed, in some states nonprofits are losing exemptions. See Morrison, supra
note 37, at 970-71.
63. These purposes include raising poultry, NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(F); leases for
the production of alfalfa, Id at § 8(l)(G); and custom spraying, fertilizing or harvesting. Id
at § 8(l)(M).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56. The exemptions for alfalfa leases and for
poultry seem to run counter to this purpose. Still, the decisions as to what to include or to
exclude from the legislation are not subject to substantive judicial review. See infra note
140.
65. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(I)(L).
66. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(K).
67. The history of the North Dakota corporate farm statute is contrary to this observa-
tion. In North Dakota the widespread Depression foreclosures prompted the ban on corpo-
rate farming. See McElroy, North Dakota'sAnti-Corporate Farming Act, 36 N.D.L. REV. 96
(1960).
68. See supra text accompanying note 10.
69. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(E).
[Vol. 6:247
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perimental objectives of the corporation or syndicate. 70
Third, exemptions are established for agricultural land ac-
quired for "nonfarming purposes.""' In this respect, family farms do
not receive protection from ongoing physical encroachment. Pro-
ductive cropland may still be converted into parking lots, factories
and split-level ranchhouses. 72 The land must be "necessary" for the
nonfarming business and can be acquired for either "immediate or
potential use."7 3 While "potential" is undefined, land held under
this exemption may not be held for more than five years and, if used
for farming during that time, must be leased either to an unincorpo-
rated farmer or to a family farm corporation.74
A final clause protects previously held land so long as there is
continuous ownership by the same corporation.75 To fall within the
terms of this grandfather clause, the land must have been used for
farming on the effective date of the amendment.76 The corporation
must also have either owned or leased the land or held a legal or
beneficial interest in the land on that date as well.77
Having surveyed the regulatory provisions of the Nebraska cor-
porate prohibition, it is then necessary to examine the federal consti-
tutional constraints, if any, within which the legislation must
operate.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Business corporations have traditionally been subject to exten-
sive state regulations.78 Corporate ownership of land is included
70. Id. There exists, however, no definition of what constitutes an "incidental" sale.
The Nebraska language can be constructively compared to the Iowa statute, which states:
"Commercial sales are incidental to the research or experimental objectives of the corpora-
tion when they are less than twenty-five percent of the gross sales of the primary product of
the research." IOWA CODE ANN. § 172.C.4(2) (1982 Supp.).
71. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(J). Acquisition of the "mineral rights on agricultural
land" are separately protected. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(1). One must wonder whether
the five year limitation in § 8(l)(J) applies to that exemption as well.
72. Such protection is provided, in part at least, by federal law. Farmland Protection
Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4202(b) (1981 Supp.).
73. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(J).
74. Id
75. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l)(D).
76. Id
77. Id. "For purposes of this exemption," the amendment reads, "a contract signed as
of the effective date of this amendment shall be considered as owned .. " Id.
78. See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2001-21-20,147 (1977). Two different ways of
controlling corporate actions should be distinguished. First, the state could work through its
corporation laws, restricting the legitimate purposes and powers of corporations organized
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within the purview of that regulatory control. In some instances,
companies are banned from holding land for particular purposes, 79
while in other instances, ownership is approved except for particular
purposes.80 Historically, a corporation was limited to holding only
those lands which were necessary and proper for its legitimate busi-
ness. While the actual exercise of this state power over corpora-
tions has steadily declined in recent years, 82 no dispute has arisen
over the conceptual and legal basis underlying the power's
exercise.83
Extensive state control over corporations, however, is not coter-
minous with unbridled state regulation. In 1963, for example, the
Iowa Supreme Court clearly set limits on that state's power when it
held: While corporations are creatures of the state, subject to con-
trol by the state, that control is not absolute and is subject to limita-
tions found elsewhere in both the federal and state constitutions.84
Three approaches which may be used in seeking to challenge corpo-
rate farm legislation on federal constitutional grounds involve the
due process,85 equal protection8 6 and commerce87 clauses of the con-
stitution 8 Irrational regulations, unreasonable classifications and
under that state's laws. Second, the state could enact legislation simply as a general measure
in furtherance of its general police powers. Nebraska follows the latter approach.
79. See, e.g., Middleton v. Georgetown Mercantile Co., 117 Miss. 134, 77 So. 956 (1918)
(corporation may not hold agricultural land).
80. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. State ex re. Coryell, 198 Okla. 565, 180 P.2d 631 (1947)
(corporation cannot hold land except that necessary and proper for its legitimate business).
81. See, e.g., LeForce v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969).
82. HENN, CORPORATIONS 283 (1961).
It is important to distinguish between the "purposes" and the "powers" of a corpo-
ration. Corporations are organized for thepurpose of carrying on and conducting
certain specified business or activity. They are granted powers to be used to per-
form functions for which they are organized. There is an obvious distinction be-
tween the objects or business which a corporation is organized to accomplish or
conduct and the powers with which it is vested for the purpose of conducting the
business or attaining its objects.
Coal Harbor Stock Farm v. Meier, 191 N.w.2d 583, 587 (N.D. 1971) (emphasis supplied).
83. Corporations are creatures of statute. The state thus has reserved unto itself the
authority to allow or to disallow the exercise of any given corporate power and the right to
define legitimate corporate purposes. Limitations on either may be expressed either through
statute or through constitution.
84. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, -, 125 N.W.2d 210, 218 (1963).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV.
86. Id
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
88. This article will examine only federal constitutional questions. The Nebraska initi-
ative measure indicated that the amendment should become part of the Nebraska constitu-
tion "notwithstanding other provisions" of that constitution. See supra note 7, Initiative 300,
"Initiative Petition to Preserve the Family Farm," unnumbered paragraph 5.
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excessive burdens on commerce would form the respective basis of
each of these constitutional claims.
A. The Due Process And Equal Protection Questions
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Asbury Hospital v. Cass Co. ," di-
rectly rejected due process and equal protection challenges to a state
prohibition on corporate ownership of farmland. In Asbury Hospi-
tal the Supreme Court considered the 1932 North Dakota corporate
farming statute which said that corporations holding land "used or
usable for farming or agriculture"9 at the time of the enactment
must divest such lands within ten years, except for those lands "rea-
sonably necessary in the conduct of their business." 9 1 Corporations,
further, were banned from the business of farming,92 and land held
in violation of that statute was made subject to escheat. 9 3 Plaintiff
corporation, Asbury Hospital, challenged North Dakota's statute as
violating the due process clause. The corporation alleged that the
state could not statutorily force a sale of land innocently acquired
when the corporation could not recapture its original investment.94
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, observing that a state
has an "unqualified power ...to exclude a foreign corporation
from doing business or acquiring or holding property within it." 95
The Supreme Court held:
The total exclusion of a corporation owning fixed property within
a state requires it to sell or otherwise dispose of such prop-
erty. . . .While applicant is not compelled by the present stat-
ute to cease all activities in North Dakota, the greater power
includes the less.96
In denying Asbury Hospital's due process claim, the Supreme Court
continued to shun substantive due process challenges to state eco-
nomic regulatory legislation.
The Court first signaled the death of substantive due process
claims in Nebbia v. New York . In Nebbia the Court was faced with
89. 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
90. Id at 209.
91. Id
92. id at 214.
93. Id. at 209.
94. Id at 211-12. Plaintiff corporation argued, in Asbury, that its land should receive
greater protection because it was innocently acquired. By this, the corporation meant that
the land was lawfully acquired free of any restrictions. Id at 211.
95. Id at 211 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 212.
97. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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a challenge to legislated milk price supports. The New York legisla-
ture had established a Milk Control Board with power, among other
things, to fix minimum and maximum retail prices. The Board set
milk prices at nine cents a quart, a price which Nebbia undersold.
The Supreme Court noted that the controls were imposed in 1932,
when prices were "much below the cost of production. 98 The de-
cline in milk prices, the Court said, substantially exceeded the de-
cline in prices generally. "The situation of the families of dairy
producers had become desperate ... 
Plaintiff argued that the enforcement of the milk price controls
denied him due process of law. °° He argued that the use of prop-
erty and the making of contracts were matters of private, not public,
concern.'' "Notwithstanding the admitted power to correct ex-
isting economic ills by appropriate regulation of business," Nebbia
said, "direct fixation of prices is a type of regulation absolutely
forbidden."'' 02
The Supreme Court rejected Nebbia's argument and articu-
lated the breadth of state legislative powers over economic matters.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the
absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy reasonably may be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purpose. 103
The Court concluded:
Price control, like any other form of regulation, is unconstitu-
tional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrele-
vant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an
unnecessary and unwarranted interference with individual
liberty. "
The Nebbia philosophy, that states have wide latitude to regulate
their own economic affairs, has been reflected in a series of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions regarding business regulation comparable
to Nebraska's corporate farm ban. In Lincoln Federal Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co. ,' the Supreme Court consid-
98. Id. at 515.
99. Id.
100. Id at 521.
101. Id. at 523.
102. Id at 531.
103. Id at 537.
104. Id. at 539.
105. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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ered the state "right-to-work" laws of Nebraska and North Caro-
lina."° Those laws provided that employers were to keep workers
without regard to whether they were or were not members of a labor
union.107 Employers were forbidden from entering into contracts
obligating themselves to exclude persons from employment because
they did or did not belong to a union. As in Nebbia, the law was
challenged as being a due process violation in that it improperly
interfered with the right of a private individual to contract.0 8
In Ferguson v. Skrupa,'0 9 the Supreme Court faced a challenge
to a statute regulating who may own and operate a business engaged
in the practice of "debt adjusting."'' The State of Kansas had
made it unlawful for anyone to operate such an enterprise except as
an incident to "the lawful practice of law.""' The federal district
court enjoined enforcement of the statute after Skrupa argued that
the business of debt adjusting was a "useful and desirable" one, and
that his business activities were not "inherently immoral or danger-
ous" or in any way contrary to the public welfare." 2 The presence of
those elements, Skrupa said, was necessary prior to his business be-
ing "absolutely prohibited."' 13
Most recently, in North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Store,' " the Supreme Court considered a North Da-
kota statute which required an applicant for a permit to operate a
pharmacy to be either a registered pharmacist or a corporation the
majority stock in which was owned by registered pharmacists.'"
Snyder's Drug Stores Inc. was denied a permit since it was a wholly-
106. Id at 527.
107. Id. at 527-28.
108. Id. at 533. The Court noted that appellants argued that two "liberties" were denied:
"(1) to refuse to hire or retain any person in employment because he is or is not a union
member and (2) to make a contract or agreement to engage in such employment discrimina-
tion against union or non-union members." Id.
109. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
110. Id at 726-27. "Debt adjusting," the Court said, is defined by statute as "the making
of a contract, express or implied, with a particular debtor whereby the debtor agrees to pay a
certain amount of money periodically to the person engaged in the debt adjusting business
who shall for a consideration distribute the same among certain specified creditors in ac-
cordance with a plan agreed upon." Id at 727.
111. Id. at 727.
112. Id. Skrupa concluded that a business which meets all of these conditions could not
be "absolutely prohibited" by statute.
113. Id.
114. 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
115. Id. at 157-58. These pharmacists must also be "actively and regularly employed in
and responsible for the management, supervision and operation of such pharmacy ..
Id. at 158.
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owned subsidiary of Red Owl Stores Inc., a corporation not meeting
the statutory ownership requirements. The plaintiff argued that the
decision in Louis K Liggett Co. v. Baldridge"I6 controlled the situa-
tion. In Liggett the Supreme Court held that it was "clear" that
"mere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a
drug store, can have no real or substantial relation to the public
health; and that the act in question creates an unreasonable and un-
necessary restriction upon private business."'" 17
In each of these three cases, however, the Supreme Court up-
held the right of the state to enact the business regulation chal-
lenged. State legislatures, the Court said in Lincoln Union, were not
to be "put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress business
and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the pub-
lic welfare." ' 1 8 The court held that "states have power to legislate
against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some
valid federal law."' 19 What constitutes an "injurious practice" is be-
yond the scope of judicial review. The Court pointed out in Skrupa,
"We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.' '1 20
Thus, for example, the pharmacy regulation in Snyder Drug Stores
was judicially acceptable since the state legislature could properly
have concluded that persons selling "drugs and poisons" were in
need of "knowledge in a high degree," a problem which the owner-
ship requirement addressed. 121
Under the principles articulated in these Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, Nebraska's corporate farm ban would likely pass con-
stitutional muster. The prohibition is aimed at perceived "injurious
practices in [that state's] internal commercial and business af-
fairs." 22 Furthermore, the ban is not "demonstrably irrelevant" to
the legislative policy sought to be effected. 123 There is a concern
over the consequences of possible vertical integration in the agricul-
116. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
117. Id at 113.
118. Lincoln, 335 U.S. at 536-37.
119. Id at 536.
120. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 730.
121. Snyder's Drug Store, 414 U.S. at 166 (quoting Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S.
114).
122. Lincoln, 335 U.S. at 536.
123. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 539.
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ture industry.' 24 There is a quantifiable adverse impact which non-
family corporate farms have on the economic and social well-being
of small rural towns.' 25 There is a substantial concern both regard-
ing the ability of the new farmer to enter the industry 26 and regard-
ing the ability of the established family farmer to remain
economically competitive. 127 In light of these problems, the State of
Nebraska may fashion responsive economic regulation with little in-
terference from the federal courts on due process grounds.
Arguments predicated on an equal protection challenge to cor-
porate farm restrictions have fared no better than due process
claims. The Supreme Court expressly rejected an equal protection
challenge in Asbury Hospital. 28 In Asbury the hospital corporation
alleged that the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated by the statutory exceptions (1) for lands
owned and held by corporations whose business is dealing in farm-
lands;' 29 and (2) for lands belonging to cooperative corporations,
seventy-five percent of whose members are farmers residing on
farms or depending principally on farming for their livelihood. 3 °
The Nebraska state constitutional amendment has exceptions which
are similarly open to challenge. The stated purpose of the Nebraska
prohibition is to prevent non-family corporations from becoming
more deeply involved in that state's "crop and livestock opera-
tions." 13' The general tenor of the amendment is to absolutely pro-
hibit corporations from "engag[ing] in farming or ranching."' 13 2 The
amendment, however, provides for several broad exceptions to this
general prohibition. "Land leases by alfalfa processors for the pro-
duction of alfalfa" are excluded from the ban, for example, but
leases for the production of sweet clover, a closely related agricul-
tural product, are not. 133 The amendment extends to "livestock op-
erations" but excludes, in its entirety, "agricultural land operated
• ..for the purpose of raising poultry."'' 34 Questions may be raised
124. See supra note 25.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 23 to 31.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 20 to 22.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 32 to 34.
128. Asbury Hospital, 326 U.S. at 214-15.
129. Initiative Measure of 1932, North Dak. Laws, 1933, pp. 494, 495, as amended by
Chap. 89, Laws 1933, and Chap. 111, Laws 1935, § 2.
130. Id at§4.
131. Object Clause, Initiative 300, Nebraska, November 2, 1982.
132. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(l).
133. Id at § 8(I)(G).
134. Id at § 8(I)(F).
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about the rationale for these broad exceptions.
These legislative distinctions do not render Nebraska's corpo-
rate farm ban unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. In As-
bury Hospital, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained the North Dakota
legislation with its various exceptions:
The legislature is free to make classifications in the application of
a statute which are relevant to the legislative purpose. The ulti-
mate test of validity is not whether the classes differ but whether
the differences between them are pertinent to the subject with re-
spect to which the classification is made. 135
The Court then articulated the test of constitutional review which it
would apply in such situations: "Statutory discrimination between
classes which are in fact different will not be deemed to be a denial
of equal protection if any state of facts could be conceived which
would support it."' 136 What the Supreme Court said, in effect, was
that it will not "redraw the lines" established by a state legislature in
a state's internal economic affairs. All legislation involves decisions
regarding what to include and what to exclude. 137 With the case of
corporate farm legislation, the intent is to preserve the family farm
within the "traditional core of agricultural production."'' 38  While
decisions as to what constitutes that "core" in Nebraska may be
questioned as unwise, it would be difficult for the Supreme Court to
find that no "state of facts could be conceived which would support"
them.
B. The Commerce Clause Question
The commerce clause 139 poses more substantial questions re-
garding the constitutional validity of corporate farm restrictions
than do the due process or equal protection clauses. The wide def-
135. Asbury Hospital, 326 U.S. at 214.
136. Id. at 215.
137. The Supreme Court has held:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.
If the classification has some "reasonable basis", it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality. The problems of government are practical
ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it
may be, and unscientific. [S]tatutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citations omitted).
138. See supra text accompanying note 54.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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erence given to state legislative decisions for the latter constitutional
inquiries gives way to predominating national interests in the for-
mer. 40 The commerce clause vests in the federal government the
power to regulate "[c]ommerce . . . among the several states."'' 4 1
State corporate farming legislation must be evaluated to determine
first, if it affects an enterprise engaged in commerce, and second, if
such an effect is excessively burdensome on commerce in contraven-
tion of the constitutional framework of regulation. No commerce
clause challenges have been brought against corporate farm restric-
tions. 42 The dual restrictions in Nebraska's corporate farm regula-
tions-those on operation and those on ownership-'- 43must be
examined individually, for they raise different commerce clause
issues.
The operation of farms falls within the purview of the com-
merce clause of the federal constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court,
in United States v. Darby,'4 seemed to limit the applicability of the
clause when it sustained the federal power to regulate "production
of goodsfor commerce."'1 45 After this decision, it appeared that agri-
cultural goods produced for in-state use, or for on-farm consump-
tion were not covered by the commerce clause. The scope of
"commerce" in the agricultural areas, however, was so broadened in
Wickard v. Filburn 146 that little question can now exist as to the gen-
eral applicability of the commerce clause to that industry. In Wick-
ard the Supreme Court considered whether the federal government
could set marketing quotas for the production of wheat. 4  Wick-
ard, an Ohio farmer, raised a crop of wheat partially for marketing
and partially for on-farm consumption. The amount raised for mar-
keting alone fell below the established quota; however, the quota
was exceeded when the crop raised for on-farm consumption was
also considered. Wickard argued that the production of wheat for
his on-farm consumption was "local in character" with effects on
140. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). "[T]he familiar test is that of uniformity
versus locality: if a case falls within an area in commerce thought to demand a uniform
national rule, state action is struck down." 1d at 728.
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
142. One legal commentator states: "This potential problem was not argued in Asbury.
Indeed, Chief Justice Stone enticingly mentions this omission in his opinion. Did he do so
to suggest that a serious issue was not canvassed by counsel? Or merely that counsel had
wisely omitted a frivolous one?" Morrison, supra note 37, at 980 (footnote omitted).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 38 to 53.
144. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
145. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
146. 317 U.S. Il1 (1942).
147. Id. at 113-15.
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interstate commerce which "are at most 'indirect.' ,,148 Thus, he
continued, the commerce power of Congress did not reach such
production.
The Supreme Court rejected those arguments citing Gibbons v.
Ogden,149 which defined the "federal commerce power with a
breadth never yet exceeded."' 50 The Wickard court articulated a
test for what may be regulated consistent with the commerce clause:
"[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be re-
garded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce. . . ." 5 The farm operations reached by Nebraska's corpo-
rate farming restrictions 15 2 fall within the scope of this regulation,
"clearly exert[ing] a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce" even should the products, like those in Wickard, not actually
be placed in the stream of commerce. Particularly in the areas of
hog, 5 3 wheat, 154 and cattle'55 production, the State of Nebraska has
sufficient agricultural production to affect both the availability and
price of products nationwide.
The mere ownership of farmland poses a more difficult ques-
tion of whether such activity is in the nature of being "commerce."
The Supreme Court cast some doubt on the issue when, in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,156 it held that "a
contract of insurance, considered as a thing apart from negotiation
and execution, does not itself constitute interstate commerce.
' 157
Similarly, one legal commentator has noted, "[Flederal investment
legislation, both securities laws and more recent interstate land sales
148. Id at 119.
149. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
150. 317 U.S. at 120. The Gibbons court said: "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it
is something more, -it is intercourse. 22 U.S. at 189.
151. 317 U.S. at 125.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 42 to 48.
153. Nebraska marketed over 6.5 million head of hogs in 1980, recognizing a gross in-
come of nearly $572 million. These production figures placed the state fifth in the nation in
both categories, behind only Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota and Missouri. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURE STATISTICS 318 (1981).
154. Nebraska harvested an estimated three million acres of wheat in 1980 with a total
production of over 112 million bushels, respectively placing it eighth and seventh in the
nation. AGRICULTURE STATISTICS, supra note 153, at 5.
155. Nebraska marketed over six million head of cattle in 1980, recognizing a gross in-
come of nearly three billion dollars. These production figures placed the state third in the
nation in both categories, behind only Texas and Iowa. AGRICULTURE STATISTICS, supra
note 153, at 308-09.
156. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
157. Id., at 546-47; cf. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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legislation, has depended on interstate or postal movement of the
solicitation documents, not on the nature of the ownership itself."' 15 8
Questions can thus be raised regarding whether holding title to real
property, including corporate ownership of farmland, is subject to
the same analysis.
The Supreme Court, in South-Eastern Underwriters Association,
held that characerization of a contract simply as "ownership" or not
is not dispositive of whether it is part of "interstate commerce." The
"[e]ntire transaction, of which that contract is but a part" should
rather be examined to determine "whether there may be a chain of
events which becomes interstate commerce."' 59
In Nebraska, the prohibited acquisition of farmland by a cor-
poration would be applicable only when it involved the corporation
in the production and distribution of farm products.'60 Commercial
transactions in the agricultural industry, involving local changes in
ownership, have previously been litigated before the U.S. Supreme
Court and found to be "commerce." In Swift & Co. v. United
States,"' a commerce clause case decided in the early 1900s, the
Supreme Court considered congressional authority over allegations
of price fixing in local stockyard sales. 162 Local stockyard buying
and selling was also the subject of scrutiny by the Supreme Court in
Stafford v. Wallace. 63 In each case the Supreme Court found a
"current of commerce" to exist.' 64 The Stafford Court held that:
[the stock] transactions can not be separated from the movement
to which they contribute and necessarily take on its character.
The commission men are essential in making the sales, without
which the flow of the current would be obstructed. 165
The Court continued:
The sales are not in this aspect merely local transactions. They
create a local change of title, it is true, but they do not stop the
flow; they merely change the private interests in the subject of the
current, not interfering with, but, on the contrary, being indispen-
sable to its continuity ... 166
158. Morrison, supra note 37, at 981 (citations omitted).
159. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 547.
160. Indeed, the hog, wheat and cattle business in Nebraska is a multi-billion dollar in-
dustry. See supra notes 153 to 155.
161. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
162. Id. at 390-93, 395.
163. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
164. Id at 518-19.
165. Id. at 516.
166. Id
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In fact, the language of the Nebraska corporate farm ban places
it neatly into the Supreme Court's "transactions" and "current of
commerce" tests. Nebraska does not proscribe simple corporate
ownership of farmland. Rather, the amendment places a ban on
corporations "acquir(ing) or otherwise obtain(ing) an interest ...
in any title to real estate used for farming or ranching in this state
... 167 It is the act of acquisition, the business transaction, which
is regulated rather than the mere holding of title. The act of trans-
ferring ownership to the land on which crops are produced does not
change the nature of the current of commerce in agricultural prod-
ucts. The transactions involving the land's ownership may change
the private interests in the means of production, but they do not
change the fact of production and distribution. Thus, under the rea-
soning articulated in the Swift and Stafford cases, the transactions
cannot be separated from the actual production of the crops and
livestock to which that land is devoted and from the interstate com-
merce which that production necessarily implies. In the words of
the Supreme Court in South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the
acquisition of farmland, even by a corporate conglomerate, is the
first part in "a chain of events which becomes interstate
commerce." 
1 6 8
Having thus established that both the ownership and the opera-
tion of farmland constitutes "commerce" within the meaning of the
federal Constitution, it becomes necessary to determine whether Ne-
braska's prohibition on non-family corporate farming violates con-
stitutional limits by placing an excessive burden on interstate
commerce.
The validity of state regulation affecting interstate commerce
depends upon a balancing of the national interests in uniform regu-
lation against distinctive local interests.' 69 The presence of a local
interest is clear. Traditionally, states are allowed to define and cre-
ate property rights within their respective territories.17 0 States, also,
have almost exclusive rights to create corporations and to define
their limits.' 7' With corporations, states have exercised these rights
in diverse ways, with some banning corporate ownership of land for
particular purposes and others banning corporate ownership except
167. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1).
168. South Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 546-47.
169. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 Howard) 299, 319 (1951).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 79 to 83.
171. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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for particular purposes. 172 Not even this right to define property
and corporation law, however, allows a state to evade constitutional
limits.
States may, consistent with constitutional commerce clause lim-
its, adopt economic regulations "to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest."' I7 3 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 74 held that "[i]f a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree."' 75 The Court continued by stat-
ing that four factors would be considered in the balancing process:
the nature of the local interest; the extent of the local benefits; the
extent of the burden on interstate commerce; and whether the local
interests could be protected with a lesser burden on interstate
activities. 176
The Supreme Court's inquiry into a state corporate farm prohi-
bition would thus seek to balance the local support for family farm-
ing against broader national interests. To sustain the validity of
Nebraska's amendment, the Supreme Court would need to find that
family farm preservation is a "legitimate local purpose" and that an
absolute ban on corporate farmland acquisition will not place a
"clearly excessive burden" on interstate commerce. 177 The purposes
of the ban unquestionably are "legitimate" for purposes of com-
merce clause analysis. While the Nebraska law does not expressly
articulate its underlying policy objectives, the corporate farm bans
in Iowa' 78 and South Dakota' 79 do. The prevention of monopoliza-
tion, 180 the preservation of a social structure, 18 1 and the promotion
of industry efficiency, 18 2 all go well beyond the self-serving local
economic protectionism which the Supreme Court has struck as not
172. See supra text accompanying notes 79 and 80.
173. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
174. Id
175. Id at 142.
176. Id.
177. Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-44 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945).
178. IOWA CODE § 172C.2 (1983).
179. "The Legislature of the state of South Dakota recognizes the importance of the
family farm to the economic and moral stability of the state, and the Legislature recognizes
that the existence of the family farm is threatened by conglomerates in farming." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-9A-1 (1981 Supp.).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 178-79.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 23 to 31.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 178-79.
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being a legitimate purpose. 8 3 Similarly, the constitutional balanc-
ing would most likely weigh in favor of Nebraska's state regulation.
One legal commentator noted:
[T]he actual burden on commerce [of corporate farm prohibi-
tions] remains hypothetical. Unlike . . . other cases, in which
specific dollar costs could be associated with state regulations,
here a corporation can only express the hope that it could operate
a farm on a more economic basis than another purchaser, or
might offer a higher price for the land.'" 4
Hypothetical arguments seem to fall short of the "clearly excessive
burden" test which would result in constitutional infirmities. When
balanced against the perceived local need for the farm legislation
85
and the historical right of the state to control its own property and
corporation laws, a commerce clause challenge to state corporate
farm prohibitions would probably fail.
CONCLUSION
Two new trends in the commercial structure of midwestern
farming have become apparent in recent years. One involves the
transformation of family farm units into family farm corporations
while the other involves the subsumation of the family farm by large
nonfarm conglomerate corporations. Generally, the trend towards
family farm corporations is viewed as being beneficial for the pres-
ervation of the family farm as a viable social and economic unit.
Placing the family farm into the corporate form yields benefits in
the areas of limited individual liability, reduction of tax burdens,
and the facilitiation of estate planning. The involvement of large
conglomerate corporations in farming, however, raises significant
concerns. Inflated land prices, the transfer of population and in-
come to metropolitan areas, unfair market competition and a gen-
eral decline in the quality of rural life are all impacts thought to
accrue from such involvement.
As a result of these concerns over conglomerate corporate
farming, several midwestern states, including Nebraska, have en-
acted corporate farm prohibitions. These regulations curtail the
right of non-family corporations to own and operate agricultural
183. Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379-81 (1976); Polar Ice Cream &
Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 377 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-23 (1935).
184. Morrison, supra note 37, at 986.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 20 to 34.
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lands. Questions exist, however, as to the constitutional legitimacy
of this state regulation of corporate farming. Challenges could be
brought under the due process, equal protection and commerce
clauses of the federal constitution. None, however, can withstand
close scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to invalidate state eco-
nomic regulations on the basis of substantive due process. The
Court now holds that states have the right to enact economic legisla-
tion if any rational basis can be conceived to justify it. The substan-
tial concerns raised regarding conglomerate corporate farming
would provide such a basis.
Neither is there a classification which is constitutionally infirm.
Minimum Court scrutiny again is provided with a conceivable ra-
tional basis being the touchstone of constitutional review.
Finally, no commerce clause violation arises from Nebraska's
corporate farm prohibition. Nebraska has legitimate local interests
which it may wish to advance by its farming regulation. The pursuit
'f those interests is done in the historical light of allowing states to
define their own corporation and property law. These considera-
tions must be balanced against an inquiry into whether the statute
places a clearly excessive burden on interstate commerce. The bur-
dens which are advanced in opposition to corporate farming legisla-
tion, however, are largely hypothetical and fail to meet the clearly
excessive test.
Nebraska has adopted a state constitutional solution to a per-
ceived corporate threat to its social and economic rural institutions.
No federal constitutional barriers exist to obstruct it.
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